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Abstract. Flow networks are inductively defined, assembled from small network mod-
ules to produce arbitrarily large ones, with interchangeable and expanding functionally-
equivalent parts. We carry out this induction formally using a domain-specific language
(DSL). Associated with our DSL is a typing system (or static semantics), a system of
formal annotations that enforce desirable properties of flow networks as invariants across
their interfaces. A prerequisite for a type theory is a formal semantics, i.e., a rigorous
definition of the entities that qualify as feasible flows through the networks, possibly re-
stricted to satisfy additional efficiency or safety requirements. We carry out this via a
denotational semantics.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Flow Networks. Many large-scale, safety-critical systems can be viewed as interconnections
of subsystems, or modules, each of which is a producer, consumer, or regulator of flows. These
flows are characterized by a set of variables and a set of constraints thereof, reflecting inherent
or assumed properties or rules governing how the modules operate and what constitutes safe
operation. Our notion of flow encompasses streams of physical entities (e.g., vehicles on a
road, fluid in a pipe), data objects (e.g., sensor network packets, video frames), or consumable
resources (e.g., electric energy, compute cycles).
Traditionally, the design and implementation of such flow networks follows a bottom-up
approach, enabling system designers to certify desirable safety invariants of the system as a
whole: Properties of the full system depend on a complete determination of the underlying
properties of all subsystems. For example, the development of real-time applications neces-
sitates the use of real-time kernels so that timing properties at the application layer (top) can
be established through knowledge and/or tweaking of much lower-level system details (bot-
tom), such as worst-case execution or context-switching times [DL97, LBJ+95, Reg02], spe-
cific scheduling and power parameters [AMM01, PLS01, SLM98, Sta00], among many others.
While justifiable in some instances, this vertical approach does not lend itself well to
emerging practices in the assembly of complex large-scale systems – namely, the integration
of various subsystems into a whole by “system integrators” who may not possess the requisite
expertise or knowledge of the internals of these subsystems [KBS04]. This latter alternative
can be viewed as a horizontal and incremental approach to system design and implementation,
which has significant merits with respect to scalability and modularity. However, it also poses
a major and largely unmet challenge with respect to verifiable trustworthiness – namely, how
to formally certify that the system as a whole will satisfy specific safety invariants and to
determine formal conditions under which it will remain so, as it is augmented, modified, or
subjected to local component failures.
Incremental and Modular Design. Several approaches to system design, modeling and anal-
ysis have been proposed in recent years, overlapping with our notion of flow networks. Apart
from the differences in the technical details – at the level of formalisms and mathematics that
are brought to bear – our approach distinguishes itself from the others by incorporating from
its inception three inter-related features/goals: (A) the ability to pursue system design and anal-
ysis without having to wait for missing (or broken) components to be inserted (or replaced),
(B) the ability to abstract away details through the retention of only the salient variables and
constraints at network interfaces as we transition from smaller to larger networks, and (C) the
ability to leverage diverse, unrelated theories to derive properties of components and small
networks, as long as such networks share a common language at their interfaces – a strongly-
typed Domain-Specific Language (DSL) that enables assembly and analysis that is agnostic to
components’ internal details and to theories used to derive properties at their interfaces.
Our DSL provides two primitive constructors, one is of the form (M1 ∥ M2) and the
other of the form bind (N , ⟨a, b⟩). The first juxtaposes two networksM1 andM2 in parallel,
and the second binds an output port a to an input port b in a network N . With these two
primitive constructors, we define others as derived and according to need. A distinctive feature
of our DSL is the presence of holes in network specifications, together with constructs of the
form: (letX =M in N ), which says “networkMmay be safely placed in the occurrences of
hole X in network N ”. What “safely” means, depends on the invariant properties that typings
are formulated to enforce. There are other useful constructs involving holes which we discuss
later in the paper.
Types and Formal Semantics. Associated with our DSL is a type theory, a system of formal
annotations to express desirable properties of flow networks together with rules that enforce
them as invariants across their interfaces, i.e., the rules guarantee the properties are preserved
as we build larger networks from smaller ones.
A prerequisite for a type theory is a formal semantics, i.e., a rigorous definition of the en-
tities that qualify as safe flows through the networks. There are standard approaches which can
be extended to our DSL, one producing a denotational semantics and another an operational
semantics. In the first approach, a safe flow through the network is denoted by a function, and
the semantics of the network is the set of all such functions. In the second approach, the net-
work is uniquely rewritten to another network in normal form (appropriately defined), and the
semantics of the network is its normal form or directly extracted from it. Although it is possible
to prove the equivalence of the two approaches, we choose the denotational approach to avoid
an exponential growth in the size of network specifications when rewritten to normal form in
the operational approach. We thus prove the soundness of the typing system (“a type-safe net-
work construction guarantees that flows through the network satisfy the invariants properties
enforced by types”) without having to explicitly carry out exponential-growth rewriting.
Limited Notion of Safety. For illustrative purposes only, we consider a single basic safety
property – namely, to be safe, a flow must satisfy (1) linear constraints of flow conservation
at nodes/hubs and (2) linear capacity constraints that restrict the range of permissible values
along links/connections between nodes/hubs. Types and typings are then formulated precisely
to enforce this kind of safety across interfaces.
In the full report [Kfo11] from which this paper is extracted, we consider further safety
restrictions on flows. Specifically, to be safe, a flow must additionally satisfy an objective
function that minimizes (or maximizes) some quantity. Such an objective function may be the
minimization of hop routing (a “minimal hop route” being one with minimum number of links)
or minimization of arc utilization (the “utilization of a link” being the ratio of the flow value
at the link over the upper-bound allowed at the link). For other objective functions which can
be examined in our type-theoretic framework, the reader is referred to [Kfo11], all inspired by
studies in the area of “traffic engineering” (see, e.g., [BL06] and references therein).
Paper Organization. Section 2 is devoted to preliminary definitions. Section 3 introduces
the syntax of our DSL and lays out several conditions for the well-formedness of network
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specifications written in it. We only include the let-in constructor in this report, delaying the
treatment of try-in, mix-in, and others involving holes to a follow-up report.
The formal semantics of flow networks are introduced in Section 4 and a corresponding
type theory is presented in the remaining sections. The type theory is syntax-directed, and
therefore modular, as it infers or assigns typings to objects in a stepwise inside-out manner. If
the order in which typings are inferred for the constituent parts does not matter, we additionally
say that the theory is fully compositional. We add the qualifier “fully” to distinguish our notion
of compositionality from similar, but different, notions in other areas of computer science.1
We only include an examination of modular typing inference in this paper, leaving its (more
elaborate) fully-compositional version to a follow-up report.
For lack of space, we omit all proofs in this paper, as well as all issues related to the
complexity of our algorithms. All the proofs can be found in the full report [Kfo11].
Acknowledgment. The work reported in this paper is a fraction of a collective effort involving
several people, under the umbrella of the iBench Initiative at Boston University. The website
https://sites.google.com/site/ibenchbu/ gives a list of other research activi-
ties. The DSL in this paper, with its formal semantics and type system, is a specialized version
of a DSL we introduced earlier in our work for NetSketch, an integrated environment for the
modeling, design and analysis of large-scale safety-critical systems with interchangeable parts
[BKLO09, BKLO10, SBKL11]. In addition to its DSL, NetSketch has two other components
currently under development: an automated verifier (AV), and a user interface (UI) that com-
bines the DSL and the AV and adds appropriate tools for convenient interactive operation.
2 Preliminary Definitions
A small networkA is of the formA = (N,A) where N is a set of nodes and A a set of directed
arcs. Capacities on arcs are determined by a lower-bound L ∶ A → R+ and an upper-bound
U ∶ A → R+ satisfying the conditions L(a) ⩽ U(a) for every a ∈ A. We write R and R+ for
the sets of all reals and all non-negative reals, respectively. We identify the two ends of an arc
a ∈ A by writing head(a) and tail(a), with the understanding that flow moves from tail(a)
to head(a). The set A of arcs is the disjoint union (denoted “⊎”) of three sets: the set A# of
internal arcs, the set Ain of input arcs, and the set Aout of output arcs:
A = A# ⊎Ain ⊎Aout where
A# = {a ∈A ∣ head(a) ∈N and tail(a) ∈N}
Ain = {a ∈A ∣ head(a) ∈N and tail(a) /∈N}
Aout = {a ∈A ∣ head(a) /∈N and tail(a) ∈N}
The tail of an input arc, and the head of an output arc, are not attached to any node. We do not
assume A is connected as a directed graph. We assume N ≠ ∅, i.e., there is at least one node
in N, without which there would be no input/output arc and nothing to say.
A flow f in A is a function that assigns a non-negative real to every a ∈ A. Formally, a
flow f ∶A→ R+, if feasible, satisfies “flow conservation” and “capacity constraints” (below).
We call a bounded interval [r, r′] of reals, possibly negative, a type. A typing is a function
T that assigns a type to every subset of input and output arcs. Formally, T is of the form:2
T ∶ P(Ain ∪Aout) → R ×R
1 Adding to the imprecision of the word, “compositional” in the literature is sometimes used in the more
restrictive sense of “modular” in our sense.
2 Our notion of a “typing” as an assignment of types to the members of a powerset is different from
a similarly-named notion in the study of type systems elsewhere. In the latter, a typing refers to a
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where P( ) is the power-set operator, i.e., P(Ain∪Aout) = {A ∣A ⊆Ain∪Aout}. As a function,
T is not totally arbitrary and satisfies certain conditions, discussed in Section 5, which qualify
it as a network typing. We write T (A) = [r, r′] instead of T (A) = ⟨r, r′⟩, whereA ⊆Ain∪Aout.
We do not disallow the case r > r′ which is an empty type satisfied by no flow.
Informally, a typing T imposes restrictions on a flow f relative to every A ⊆ Ain ∪Aout
which, if satisfied, will guarantee that f is feasible. Specifically, if T (A) = [r, r′], then T
requires that the part of f entering through the arcs in A ∩Ain minus the part of f exiting
through the arcs in A ∩Aout must be within the interval [r, r′].
Flow Conservation, Capacity Constraints, Type Satisfaction. Though obvious, we pre-
cisely state fundamental concepts underlying our entire examination and introduce some of
our notational conventions, in Definitions 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Definition 1. If A is a subset of arcs in A and f a flow in A, we write ∑ f(A) to denote the
sum of flows assigned to all arcs in A: ∑ f(A) = ∑{ f(a) ∣a ∈ A}. By convention, ∑∅ = 0.
If A = {a1, . . . , ap} is the set of all arcs entering node n, and B = {b1, . . . , bq} is the set of all
arcs exiting node n, then conservation of flow at n is expressed by the linear equation:
(1) ∑ f(A) = ∑ f(B) (one such equation for every node n ∈N)
Definition 2. A flow f satisfies the capacity constraints at arc a ∈A if:
L(a) ⩽ f(a) ⩽ U(a) (two such inequalities for every arc a ∈A)(2)
Definition 3. A flow f is feasible iff two conditions:
– for every node n ∈N, the equation in (1) is satisfied,
– for every arc a ∈A, the two inequalities in (2) are satisfied.
Definition 4. Let T ∶ P(Ain ∪Aout)→ R×R be a typing for the small networkA. We say the
flow f satisfies T if, for every A ∈ P(Ain ∪Aout) with T (A) = [r, r′], it is the case:
r ⩽ ∑ f(A ∩Ain) − ∑ f(A ∩Aout) ⩽ r′(3)
3 DSL for Incremental and Modular Flow-Network Design (Untyped)
The definition of small networks in Sect. 2 is less general than our full definition of networks,
but it has the advantage of being directly comparable to standard graph-theoretic definitions.
Our networks in general involve what we call “holes”. A hole X is a pair (Ain,Aout) where
Ain and Aout are finite sets of input and output arcs. A holeX is a place holder where networks
can be inserted, provided the matching-dimensions condition (in Sect. 3.2) is satisfied.
We use a BNF definition to generate formal expressions, each being a formal description
of a network. Such an expression may involve subexpressions of the form: let X =M in N ,
which informally says “M may be safely placed in the occurrences of hole X in N ”. What
“safely” means depends on the invariant properties that typings are formulated to enforce.
IfA = (N,A) is a small network where A =A#⊎Ain⊎Aout, let in(A) =Ain, out(A) =
Aout, and #(A) = A#. Similarly, if X = (Ain,Aout) is a hole, let in(X) = Ain, out(X) =
derivable “typing judgment” consisting of a program expression M , a type assigned to M , and a type
environment with a type for every free variable in M .
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Aout, and #(X) = ∅. We assume the arc names of small networks and holes are all pairwise
disjoint, i.e., every small network and every hole has its own private set of arc names.
The formal expressions generated by our BNF are built up from: the set of names for small
networks and the set of names for holes, using the constructors ∥ , let, and bind:
A,B,C ∈ SMALLNETWORKS
X,Y,Z ∈ HOLENAMES
M,N ,P ∈ NETWORKS ∶∶= A small network name
∣ X hole name
∣ M ∥ N parallel connection
∣ let X =M in N let-binding of hole X
∣ bind (N , ⟨a, b⟩) bind head(a) to tail(b), where
⟨a, b⟩ ∈ out(N ) × in(N )
where in(N ) and out(N ) are the input and output arcs of N . In the full report [Kfo11],
we define in(N ) and out(N ), as well as the set #(N ) of internal arcs, by induction on the
structure of N . We say N is closed if every hole X in N is bound.
3.1 Derived Constructors
From the three constructors already introduced, namely: ∥ , let, and bind, we can define
several other constructors. Below, we present four of these derived constructors precisely, and
mention several others in Remark 1. Our four derived constructors are used as in the following
expressions, where N , Ni, andMj , are network specifications and θ is set of arc pairs:
bind (N , θ) conn(N1,N2, θ) N1 ⊕N2 let X ∈ {M1, . . . ,Mn} in N
The second above depends on the first, the third on the second, and the fourth is independent of
the three preceding it. Let N be a network specification. We write θ ⊆1-1 out(N )× in(N ) to
denote a partial one-one map from out(N ) to in(N ). We may write the entries in θ explicitly,
as in: θ = {⟨a1, b1⟩, . . . , ⟨ak, bk⟩} where {a1, . . . , ak} ⊆ out(N ) and {b1, . . . , bk} ⊆ in(N ).
Our first derived constructor generalizes bind and uses the same name. In this generaliza-
tion of bind the second argument is now θ rather than a single pair ⟨a, b⟩ ∈ out(N )× in(N ).
The expression bind (N , θ) is expanded as follows:
bind (N , θ)Ô⇒ bind (bind ( ⋯ bind (N , ⟨ak, bk⟩) ⋯ , ⟨a2, b2⟩), ⟨a1, b1⟩)
where we first connect the head of ak to the tail of bk and lastly connect the head of a1 to the
tail of b1. A little proof shows that the order in which we connect arc heads to arc tails does
not matter as far as our formal semantics and typing theory is concerned.
Our second derived constructor, called conn (for “connect”), uses the preceding gener-
alization of bind together with the constructor ∥ . Let N1 and N2 be network specifications,
and θ ⊆1-1 out(N1)× in(N2). We expand the expression conn(N1,N2, θ) as follows:
conn(N1,N2, θ) Ô⇒ bind ((N1 ∥ N2), θ)
In words, conn connects some of the output arcs in N1 with as many input arcs in N2.
Our third derived constructor is a special case of the preceding conn. LetN1 be a network
where the numberm ⩾ 1 of output arcs is the number of input arcs in another networkN2, say:
out(N1) = {a1, . . . , am} and in(N2) = {b1, . . . , bm}
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Unless otherwise stated, we assume that in every network there is a fixed ordering of the input
arcs and another fixed ordering of the output arcs – these orderings, together with the arc
names that uniquely label the positions in them, are called the input and output dimensions of
the network. Suppose the entries in out(N1) and in(N2) are listed, from left to right, in the
assumed ordering of their output and input dimensions, respectively. Let
θ = {⟨a1, b1⟩, . . . , ⟨am, bm⟩} = out(N1) × in(N2)
i.e., the first output a1 of N1 is connected to the first input b1 of N2, the second output a2 of
N1 to the second input b2 of N2, etc. Our derived constructor (N1 ⊕N2) is expanded as:
(N1 ⊕N2)Ô⇒ conn(N1,N2, θ)
which implies that in(N1 ⊕N2) = in(N1) and out(N1 ⊕N2) = out(N2). As expected, ⊕ is
associative as far as our formal semantics and typing theory are concerned, i.e., the semantics
and typings for N1 ⊕ (N2 ⊕N3) and (N1 ⊕N2)⊕N3 are the same.
A fourth derived constructor generalizes let and is expanded into nested let-bindings:
(let X ∈ {M1, . . . ,Mn} in N )Ô⇒
(let X1 =M1 in (⋯ (let Xn =Mn in (N1 ∥ ⋯ ∥Nn) ) ⋯) )
where X1, . . . ,Xn are fresh hole names and Ni is N with Xi substituted for X , for every
1 ⩽ i ⩽ n. Informally, this constructor says that every one of the networks {M1, . . . ,Mn} can
be “safely” placed in the occurrences of X in N .
Remark 1. While the preceding derived constructors are expanded using our primitive con-
structors, not every useful constructor can be so expanded. For example, the constructor
try X∈ {M1, . . . ,Mn} in N
which we take to mean that at least oneMi can be “safely” placed in all the occurrences of
X in N , cannot be expanded using our primitives so far and the way we later define their
semantics. Another constructor also requiring a more developed examination is
mix X∈ {M1, . . . ,Mn} in N
which we take to mean that a mixture of several Mi can be selected at the same time and
“safely” placed in the occurrences of X in N , generally placing different Mi in different
occurrences. The constructors try and mix are examined in a follow-up report. An informal
understanding of how they differ from the constructor let can be gleaned from Example 1.
Another useful constructor introduces recursively defined components with (unbounded)
repeated patterns. In its simplest form, it can be written as:
letrec X=M[X] in N [X]
where we writeM[X] to indicate that X occurs free inM, and similarly in N . Informally,
this construction corresponds to placing an open-ended network of the formM[M[M[⋯]]]
in the occurrences of X in N . A well-formedness condition here is that the input and output
dimensions ofM must match those of X . We leave for future examination the semantics and
typing of letrec, which are still more involved than those of try and mix.
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3.2 Well-Formed Network Specifications
In the full report [Kfo11], we spell out 3 conditions, not enforced by the BNF definition at
the beginning of Section 3, which guarantee what we call the well-formedness of network
specifications. We call them:
– the matching-dimensions condition,
– the unique arc-naming condition,
– the one binding-occurrence condition.
We only briefly explain what the second condition specifies: To avoid ambiguities in the formal
semantics of Section 4, we need to enforce in the specification of a networkN that no arc name
refers to two different arcs. This in turn requires that we distinguish the arcs of the different
copies of the same hole X . Thus, if we use k ⩾ 2 copies of X , we rename their arcs so that
each copy has its own set of arcs. We write 1X, . . . , kX to refer to these k copies of X . Further
details on the unique arc-naming condition are in [Kfo11].
Example 1. We illustrate several notions. We use one hole X , and four small networks: F
(“fork”), M (“merge”), A, and B. We do not assign lower-bound and upper-bound capacities
to the arcs of F, M, A, and B because they play no role before our typing theory is introduced.
Graphic representations of F, M, and X are shown in Figure 1, and of A and B in Figure 2. A
possible network specification N with two bound occurrences of X may read as follows:
N = let X ∈ {A,B} in conn( F, conn( 1X, conn( 2X, M, θ3), θ2), θ1)
where θ1 = {⟨c2, 1e1⟩, ⟨c3, 1e2⟩}, θ2 = {⟨1e3, 2e1⟩, ⟨1e4, 2e2⟩}, and θ3 = {⟨2e3, d1⟩, ⟨2e4, d2⟩}.
We wrote N using some derived constructors introduced in Section 3.1. Note that:
– all the output arcs {c2, c3} of F are connected to all the input arcs {1e1, 1e2} of 1X ,
– all the output arcs {1e3, 1e4} of 1X are connected to all the input arcs {2e1, 2e2} of 2X ,
– all the output arcs {2e3, 2e4} of 2X are connected to all the input arcs {d1, d2} of M,
Hence, according to Section 3.1, we can write more simply:
N = let X ∈ {A,B} in (F⊕ 1X ⊕ 2X ⊕M)
The specificationN says that A or B can be selected for insertion wherever hole X occurs.N
can be viewed as representing two different network configurations:
N1 = F⊕ 1A⊕ 2A⊕M and N2 = F⊕ 1B⊕ 2B⊕M
We can say nothing here about properties, such as safety, being satisfied or violated byN1 and
N2. The semantics of our let constructor later will be equivalent to requiring that both config-
urations be “safe” to use. By contrast, the constructor try mentioned in Remark 1 requires only
N1 or N2, but not necessarily both, to be safe, and the constructor mix additionally requires:
N3 = F⊕ 1A⊕ 2B⊕M and N4 = F⊕ 1B⊕ 2A⊕M
to be safe. Safe substitution into holes according to mix implies safe substitution according to



































Fig. 2: Small networks A (on the left) and B (on the right) in Example 1.
4 Formal Semantics of Flow Networks
The preceding section explained what we need to write to specify a network formally. Let N
be such a network specification. By well-formedness, every small network A appearing in N
has its own separate set of arc names, and every bound occurence iX of a hole X also has its
own separate set of arc names, where i ⩾ 1 is a renaming index. With every small network
A, we associate two sets of functions, its full semantics JAK and its IO-semantics ⟪A⟫. Let
Ain = in(A), Aout = out(A), and A# =#(A). The sets JAK and ⟪A⟫ are defined thus:
JAK = { f ∶Ain ⊎Aout ⊎A# → R+ ∣ f is a feasible flow in A}
⟪A⟫ = { f ∶Ain ⊎Aout → R+ ∣ f can be extended to a feasible flow f ′ in A}
Let X be a hole, with in(X) = Ain and out(X) = Aout. The full semantics JXK and the
IO-semantics ⟪X⟫ are the same set of functions:
JXK = ⟪X⟫ ⊆ {f ∶Ain ⊎Aout → R+ ∣ f is a bounded function}
This definition of JXK = ⟪X⟫ is ambiguous: In contrast to the uniquely defined full semantics
and IO-semantics of a small network A, there are infinitely many JXK = ⟪X⟫ for the same X ,
but exactly one (possibly JXK = ⟪X⟫ = ∅) will satisfy the requirement in clause 4 below.
Starting from the full semantics of small networks and holes, we define by induction the
full semantics JN K of a network specificationN in general. In a similar way, we can define the
IO-semantics ⟪N⟫ of N by induction, starting from the IO-semantics of small networks and
holes. For conciseness, we define JN K separately first, and then define ⟪N⟫ from JN K.
We need a few preliminary notions. LetM be a network specification. By our convention
of listing all input arcs first, all output arcs second, and all internal arcs third, let:
in(M) = {a1, . . . , ak}, out(M) = {ak+1, . . . , ak+`}, and #(M) = {ak+`+1, . . . , ak+`+m}.
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If f ∈ JMK with f(a1) = r1, . . . , f(ak+`+m) = rk+`+m, we may represent f by the sequence
⟨r1, . . . , rk+`+m⟩. We may therefore represent:
– [f]in(M) by the sequence ⟨r1, . . . , rk⟩,
– [f]out(M) by the sequence ⟨rk+1, . . . , rk+`⟩, and
– [f]#(M) by the sequence ⟨rk+`+1, . . . , rk+`+m⟩,
where [f]in(M), [f]out(M), and [f]#(M), are the restrictions of f to the subsets in(M),
out(M), and #(M), of its domain. LetN be another network specification and g ∈ JN K. We
define f ∥ g as follows:
(f ∥ g) = [f]in(M) ⋅ [g]in(N ) ⋅ [f]out(M) ⋅ [g]out(N ) ⋅ [f]#(M) ⋅ [g]#(N )
where “⋅” is sequence concatenation. The operation “ ∥ ” on flows is associative, but not com-
mutative, just as the constructor “ ∥ ” on network specifications. We define the full semantics
JMK for every subexpressionM of N , by induction on the structure of the specification N :
1. IfM = A, then JMK = JAK.
2. IfM = iX , then JMK = iJXK.
3. IfM = (P1 ∥ P2), then JMK = { (f1 ∥ f2) ∣ f1 ∈ JP1K and f2 ∈ JP2K}.
4. IfM = (let X = P in P ′ ), then JMK = JP ′K, provided two conditions:3
(a) dim(X) ≈ dim(P),
(b) JXK ≈ { [g]A ∣ g ∈ JPK} where A = in(P) ∪ out(P).
5. IfM = bind (P, ⟨a, b⟩), then JMK = { f ∣ f ∈ JPK and f(a) = f(b) }.
All of N is a special case of a subexpression of N , so that the semantics of N is simply JN K.
Note, in clause 2, all bound occurrences iX of the same holeX are assigned the same semantics
JXK, up to renaming of arc names. We now define the IO-semantics of N as follows:
⟪N⟫ = { [f]A ∣ f ∈ JN K}
where A = in(N ) ∪ out(N ) and [f]A is the restriction of f to A.
Remark 2. We can define rewrite rules on network specifications in order to reduce each into an
equivalent finite set of network specifications in normal form, a normal form being free of let-
bindings. We can do this so that the formal semantics of network specifications are an invariant
of this rewriting. This establishes the soundness of the operational semantics (represented by
the rewrite rules) of our DSL relative to the formal semantics defined above.
Flow Conservation, Capacity Constraints, Type Satisfaction (Continued). The fundamen-
tal concepts stated in relation to small networks A in Definitions 1, 2, and 3, are extended to
arbitrary network specificationsN . These are stated as “properties” (not “definitions”) because
they apply to JN K (not to N ), and JN K is built up inductively from {JAK ∣A occurs in N}.
3 “dim(X) ≈ dim(P)” means the number of input arcs and their ordering (or input dimension) and
the number of output arcs and their ordering (or output dimension) of X match those of P , up to
arc renaming. “JXK ≈ {[g]
A
∣g ∈ JPK}” means for every f ∶ in(X) ∪ out(X) → R+, it holds that




Property 1. The nodes of N are all the nodes in the small networks occurring in N , because
our DSL in Section 3 does not introduce new nodes beyond those in the small networks. Hence,
JN K satisfies flow conservation because, for every small network A in N , every f ∈ JAK
satisfies flow conservation at every node, i.e., the equation in (1) in Definition 1.
Property 2. The arcs introduced by our DSL, beyond the arcs in the small networks, are the
input/output arcs of the holes. Lower-bound and upper-bound capacities on the latter arcs are
set in order not to conflict with those already defined on the input/output arcs of small networks.
Hence, JN K satisfies the capacity constraints because, for every small network A in N , every
f ∈ JAK satisfies the capacity constraints on every arc, i.e., the inequalities in (2) in Definition 2.
However, stressing the obvious, even if JAK ≠ ∅ for every small network A in N , it may
still be that N is unsafe to use, i.e., it may be that there is no feasible flow in N and JN K = ∅.
We use the type system (Section 7) to reject unsafe network specifications N .
Definition 5. Let N be a network, with Ain = in(N ), Aout = out(N ), and A# = #(N ). A
typing T for N , also denoted (N ∶ T ), is a function T ∶ P(Ain ∪Aout) → R ×R, which may,
or may not, be satisfied by f ∈ ⟪N⟫ or by f ∈ JN K. We say f ∈ ⟪N⟫ or f ∈ JN K satisfies T iff,
for every A ⊆Ain ∪Aout with T (A) = [r, r′], it is the case that:
(4) r ⩽ ∑ f(A ∩Ain) − ∑ f(A ∩Aout) ⩽ r′
5 Typings Are Polytopes
LetN be a network specification, and let Ain = in(N ) and Aout = out(N ). Let T be a typing
forN that assigns an interval [r, r′] to A ⊆Ain ∪Aout. Let ∣Ain∣+ ∣Aout∣ =m, for some m ⩾ 0.
As usual, there is a fixed ordering on the arcs in Ain and again on the arcs in Aout. With no loss
of generality, suppose:
A1 = A ∩Ain = {a1, . . . , ak} and A2 = A ∩Aout = {ak+1, . . . , a`},
where ` ⩽m. Instead of writing T (A) = [r, r′], we may write:
T (A) ∶ a1 +⋯ + ak − ak+1 −⋯ − a` ∶ [r, r′]
where the inserted polarities, + or −, indicate whether the arcs are input or output, respectively.
A flow through the arcs {a1, . . . , ak} contributes a positive quantity, and through the arcs
{ak+1, . . . , a`} a negative quantity, and these two quantities together should add up to a value
within the interval [r, r′].
A typing T for Ain ∪Aout induces a polytope (or bounded polyhedron), which we call
Poly(T ), in the Euclidean hyperspace Rm. We think of the m arcs in Ain ∪ Aout as the m
dimensions of the space Rm. Poly(T ) is the non-empty intersection of at most 2 ⋅ (2m − 1)
halfspaces, because there are (2m−1) non-empty subsets in P(Ain∪Aout). The interval [r, r′],
which T assigns to such a subset A = {a1, . . . , a`} as above, induces two linear inequalities in
the variables {a1, . . . , a`}, denoted T⩾(A) and T⩽(A):
(5) T⩾(A): a1+⋯+ak−ak+1−⋯−a` ⩾ r and T⩽(A): a1+⋯+ak−ak+1−⋯−a` ⩽ r′
and, therefore, two halfspaces Half(T⩾(A)) and Half(T⩽(A)):
(6) Half(T⩾(A)) = {r ∈ Rm ∣r ⊧ T⩾(A) } and Half(T⩽(A)) = {r ∈ Rm ∣r ⊧ T⩽(A) }
where “r ⊧ T⩾(A)” means “r satisfies T⩾(A)” and similarly for “r ⊧ T⩽(A)”. We can there-
fore define Poly(T ) formally as follows:
Poly(T ) = ⋂{Half(T⩾(A)) ∩ Half(T⩽(A)) ∣ ∅ ≠ A ⊆Ain ∪Aout }
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5.1 Uniqueness and Redundancy in Typings
We can view a network typing T as a syntactic expression, with its semantics Poly(T ) being
a polytope in Euclidean hyperspace. As in other situations connecting syntax and semantics,
there are generally distinct typings T and T ′ such that Poly(T ) = Poly(T ′). This is an obvious
consequence of the fact that the same polytope can be defined by many different equivalent sets
of linear inequalities. To achieve uniqueness of typings, as well as some efficiency of manipu-
lating them, we may try an approach that eliminates redundant inequalities in the collection:
(7) {T⩾(A) ∣ ∅ ≠ A ∈ P(Ain ∪Aout) } ∪ {T⩽(A) ∣ ∅ ≠ A ∈ P(Ain ∪Aout) }
where T⩾(A) and T⩽(A) are as in (5) above. There are standard procedures which determine
if a finite set of inequalities are linearly independent and, if they are not, select an equivalent
subset of linearly independent inequalities. These issues are taken up in the full report [Kfo11].
If N1 ∶ T1 and N2 ∶ T2 are typings for networks N1 and N2 with matching input and
output dimensions, we write T1 ≡ T2 whenever Poly(T1) ≈ Poly(T2), in which case we say
that T1 and T2 are equivalent. If N1 = N2, then T1 ≡ T2 whenever Poly(T1) = Poly(T2).
Definition 6. Let T ∶ P(Ain ∪Aout)→ R×R be a typing for network specificationN , where
Ain = in(N ) and Aout = out(N ). T is a tight typing if for every typing T ′ such that T ≡ T ′
and every A ⊆Ain ∪Aout, the interval T (A) is contained in T ′(A), i.e., T (A) ⊆ T ′(A).
Proposition 1 (Every Typing Is Equivalent to a Tight Typing). There is an algorithm Tight()
which, given a typing (N ∶ T ) as input, always terminates and returns an equivalent tight typ-
ing (N ∶ Tight(T )).
5.2 Valid Typings and Principal Typings
LetN be a network, Ain = in(N ) and Aout = out(N ). A typingN ∶ T is valid iff it is sound:
(soundness) Every f0 ∶Ain ∪Aout → R+ satisfying T can be extended to a feasible f ∈ JN K.
We say the typing N ∶ T for N is a principal typing if it is both sound and complete:
(completeness) Every feasible flow f ∈ JN K satisfies T .
More succintly, using the IO-semantics ⟪N⟫ instead of the full semantics JN K, the typing
N ∶ T is valid iff Poly(T ) ⊆ ⟪N⟫, and it is principal iff Poly(T ) = ⟪N⟫. A useful notion in
type theories is subtyping. If T1 is a subtype of T2, in symbols T1 <∶ T2, this means that any
object of type T1 can be safely used in a context where an object of type T2 is expected:
(subtyping) T1 <∶ T2 iff Poly(T2) ⊆ Poly(T1).
Proposition 2 (Principal Typings Are Subtypes of Valid Typings). If (N ∶ T1) is a principal
typing, and (N ∶ T2) a valid typing for the same N , then T1 <∶ T2.
Proposition 3 (Principal Typings Are Equivalent). If (N ∶ T1) and (N ∶ T2) are two
principal typings for the same network N , then T1 ≡ T2. If T1 and T2 are tight, then T1 = T2.
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6 Inferring Typings for Small Networks
Theorem 1 (Inferring Principal Typings for Small Networks). Let A be a small network.
We can effectively compute a principal and uniformly tight typing T for A.
Example 2. Consider again the two small networks A and B from Example 1. We assign ca-
pacities to their arcs and compute their respective principal typings. The sets of arcs in A and
B are, respectively: A = {a1, . . . , a11} and B = {b1, . . . , b16}. All the lower-bounds and most
of the upper-bounds are trivial, i.e., they do not restrict flow. Specifically, the lower-bound ca-
pacity on every arc is 0, and the upper-bound capacity on every arc is a “very large number”,
unless indicated otherwise in Figure 3 by the numbers in rectangular boxes, namely:
U(a5) = 5, U(a8) = 10, U(a11) = 15, nontrivial upper-bounds in A,
U(b5) = 3, U(b6) = 2, U(b9) = 2, U(b10) = 10, nontrivial upper-bounds in B,
U(b11) = 8, U(b13) = 8, U(b15) = 10, U(b16) = 7, nontrivial upper-bounds in B.
We compute the principal typings TA and TB, by assigning a bounded interval to every subset
in P({a1, a2, a3, a4}) and P({b1, b2, b3, b4}). This is a total of 16 intervals for each, but we
can ignore the empty set to which we assign the empty interval ∅, as well as interval assign-
ments that are implied by those listed below. We use the construction in the proof (omitted in
this paper, included in the full report [Kfo11]) of Theorem 1 to compute TA and TB.
TA assignments ∶
a1 ∶ [0,15] a2 ∶ [0,25] −a3 ∶ [−15,0] −a4 ∶ [−25,0]
a1 + a2 ∶ [0,30] a1 − a3 ∶ [−10,10] a1 − a4 ∶ [−25,15]
a2 − a3 ∶ [−15,25] a2 − a4 ∶ [−10,10] −a3 − a4 ∶ [−30,0]
TB assignments ∶
b1 ∶ [0,15] b2 ∶ [0,25] −b3 ∶ [−15,0] −b4 ∶ [−25,0]
b1 + b2 ∶ [0,30] b1 − b3 ∶ [−10,12] b1 − b4 ∶ [−25,15]
b2 − b3 ∶ [−15,25] b2 − b4 ∶ [−12,10] −b3 − b4 ∶ [−30,0]
The types in rectangular boxes are those of [TA]in and [TB]in which are equivalent, and those
of [TA]out and [TB]out which are equivalent. Thus, [TA]in ≡ [TB]in and [TA]out ≡ [TB]out.
Nevertheless, TA /≡ TB, the difference being in the (underlined) types assigned to some subsets
mixing input and output arcs.
In this example, TB <∶ TA because Poly(TA) ⊆ Poly(TB). The converse does not hold. As
a result, there are feasible flows in B which are not feasible in A (some computed in [Kfo11]).
7 A Typing System
We set up a formal system for assigning typings to network specifications. The process of
inferring typings, based on this system, is deferred to Section 8. The system is in Figure 4,
where we follow standard conventions in formulating the rules. We call Γ a typing environment,
which is a finite set of typing assumptions for holes, each of the form (X ∶ T ). If (X ∶ T ) is a
































Fig. 3: An assignment of arc capacities for small networks A (left) and B (right) in Example 2.
HOLE
(X ∶ T ) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ iX ∶ iT
i ⩾ 1 is the smallest available renaming index
SMALL
Γ ⊢ A ∶ T
T is a typing for small network A
PAR
Γ ⊢ N1 ∶ T1 Γ ⊢ N2 ∶ T2
Γ ⊢ (N1 ∥ N2) ∶ (T1 ∥ T2)
BIND
Γ ⊢ N ∶ T
Γ ⊢ bind (N , ⟨a, b⟩) ∶ bind(T, ⟨a, b⟩)
⟨a, b⟩ ∈ out(N ) × in(N )
LET
Γ ⊢ M ∶ T1 Γ ∪ {(X ∶ T2)} ⊢ N ∶ T
Γ ⊢ ( let X =M in N ) ∶ T
T1 ≈ T2
Fig. 4: Typing Rules. The operations on typings, (T1 ∥ T2) and bind(T, ⟨a, b⟩), are defined in [Kfo11].
If a typing T is derived for a network specification N according to the rules in Figure 4,
it will be the result of deriving an assertion (or judgment) of the form “Γ ⊢ N ∶ T ”. If N
is closed, then this final typing judgment will be of the form “⊢ N ∶ T ” where all typing
assumptions have been discharged.
Theorem 2 (Existence of Principal Typings for Networks in General). Let N be a closed
network specification and T a typing forN derived according to the rules in Figure 4, i.e., the
judgment “⊢ N ∶ T” is derivable according to the rules. If the typing of every small network
A in N is principal (resp., valid) for A, then T is a principal (resp., valid) typing for N .
8 Inferring Typings for Flow Networks in General
The main difficulty in typing inference is in relation to let-bindings. Consider a specificationN
of the form (letX =M in P ). Let Ain = in(X) and Aout = out(X). SupposeX occurs n ⩾ 1
times in P , so that its input/output arcs are renamed in each of the n occurrences according
to: 1(Ain ∪Aout) , . . . , n(Ain ∪Aout). A typing for X and for its occurrences iX in P can be
given concretely or symbolically. If concretely, then these typings are functions of the form:
TX ∶ P(Ain ∪Aout)→ R ×R and iTX ∶ P(iAin ∪ iAout)→ R ×R
for every 1 ⩽ i ⩽ n. According to the typing rules in Figure 4, a valid typing for N requires
that: TX ≈ 1TX ≈ ⋯ ≈ nTX . If symbolically, then for every B ⊆Ain∪Aout, the interval TX(B)
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is written as [xB , yB] where the two ends xB and yB are yet to be determined, and similarly
for iTX(B) and every B ⊆ iAin ∪ iAout. For later reference, call xB a lower-end parameter and
yB an upper-end parameter. We can infer a typing for N in one of two ways, which produce
the same end result but whose organizations are very different:
(sequential) First infer a principal typing TM for M, then use k copies 1TM, . . . , nTM to
infer a principal typing TP for P , which is also a principal typing TN for N .
(parallel) Infer principal typings TM forM and TP for P , separately. TP is parametrized by
the typings iTX written symbolically. A typing forN is obtained by setting lower-end and
upper-end parameters in iTX to corresponding lower-end and upper-end values in TM.
Both approaches are modular, in that both are syntax-directed according to the inductive def-
inition of N . However, the parallel approach has the advantage of being independent of the
order in which the inference proceeds (i.e., it does not matter whether TM is inferred before
or after, or simultaneously with, TP ). We therefore qualify the parallel approach as being ad-
ditionally fully compositional, in contrast to the sequential approach which is not. Moreover,
the latter requires that the whole specification N be known before typing inference can start,
justifying the additional qualification of being a whole-specification analysis. The sequential
approach is simpler to define and is presented in full in [Kfo11]. We delay the examination of
the parallel/fully-compositional approach to a follow-up report.
9 Related and Future Work
Ours is not the only study that uses intervals as types and polytopes as typings. There were
earlier attempts that heavily drew on linear algebra and polytope theory, mostly initiated by re-
searchers who devised “types as abstract interpretations” – see [Cou97] and references therein.
However, the motivations for these earlier attempts were entirely different and applied to pro-
gramming languages unrelated to our DSL. For example, polytopes were used to define “invari-
ant safety properties”, or “types” by another name, for ESTEREL – an imperative synchronous
language for the development of reactive systems [Hal93].
Apart from the difference in motivation with these earlier works, there are also technical
differences in the use of polytopes. Whereas the earlier works consider polytopes defined by
unrestricted linear constraints [CH78, Hal93], our polytopes are defined by linear constraints
where every coefficient is +1 or −1, as implied by our Definitions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Ours are in
fact identical to linear constraints (but not necessarily the linear objective function) that arise in
the network simplex method [Cun79], i.e., linear programming applied to problems of network
flows. There is still on-going research to improve network-simplex algorithms (e.g., [RT09]),
which will undoubtedly have a bearing on the efficiency of typing inference for our DSL.
As alluded in the Introduction, we omitted an operational semantics of our DSL in this pa-
per to stay clear of complexity issues arising from the associated rewrite (or reduction) rules.
Among other benefits, relying on a denotational semantics allowed us to harness this com-
plexity by performing a static analysis, via our typing theory, without carrying out a naive
hole-expansion (or let-in elimination). We thus traded the intuitively simpler but costlier op-
erational semantics for the more compact denotational semantics.
However, as we introduce other constructs involving holes in follow-up reports (try-
in, mix-in, and letrec-in mentioned in Remark 1 of Section 3) this trade-off will diminish
in importance. An operational semantics of our DSL involving these more complex hole-
binders will bring it closer in line with various calculi involving patterns (instead of holes)
and where rewriting consists in eliminating pattern-binders. See [JK06, BCKL03, CLW03,
CKL04, BBCK07] and references therein. It remains to be seen how much of the theory devel-
oped for these pattern calculi can be adapted to an operational semantics of our DSL.
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